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Job Search and Frictional 
Unemployment 
Some Empirical Evidence 
C.J. BRUCE 
and 
J.H. MARSHALL 
The purpose of this paper is to report on some récent 
empirical research undertaken in order to provide additional 
information concerning the frictionally unemployed. 
One of the outgrowths of the last two décades' interest in inflation-
unemployment trade-offs has been a heightened interest in the con-
cept of frictional unemployment — this interest arising from the gênerai 
récognition that fiscal and monetary policies cannot be used to drive 
unemployment below its frictional level without creating severe infla-
tionary pressures. However, the main concern of récent discussions 
of frictional unemployment has been theoretical analysis, with only 
sporadic investigations of an empirical nature having been made. 
The purpose of this paper is to report on some récent empirical 
research which we hâve undertaken in order to provide additional infor-
mation concerning the frictionally unemployed. The paper is divided 
into three sections. In the first section, the theoretical setting for the 
empirical work is established. In Section II, the survey methods and 
results are presented. And in the final section, some implications of 
the findings for the theory of frictional unemployment are discussed. 
THEORITICAL SETTING 
The level of frictional unem-
ployment which will prevail in 
equilibrium1 may be defined as: 
U F = E t , (1) 
BRUCE, C.J., Assistant Professor, 
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Calgary Chamber of Commerce for its support in obtaining the coopération of Calgary 
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course, we alone retain responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions. 
1
 By «equilibrium» we mean a situation in which the flow of workers becom-
ing unemployed in a given period equals the flow of workers leaving the unemployed 
state in that period. 
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where UF is the number of workers frictionally unemployed, E is the 
flow of workers entering the (frictionally) unemployed state in each 
time period, and tF is the average number of time periods which workers 
spend frictionally unemployed. In the standard textbook treatments 
of frictional unemployment, primary emphasis has been given to the 
détermination of E. For example, Neil Chamberlain and Donald Cullen, 
in The Labor Sector, l identify three types of frictional unemployment 
according to the reasons for workers becoming unemployed. Thèse 
unemployment types they call transitional, (workers temporarily laid 
off), voluntary, (workers who hâve left their previous jobs voluntarily), 
and entry, (workers who hâve newly entered or re-entered the labour 
force). 
Recently, however, attention has been turned towards the second 
élément of the frictional unemployment équation, the time spent fric-
tionally unemployed, tF. As frictional unemployment is usually de-
fined to occur only when the stock of available vacancies equals or 
exceeds the stock of unemployed workers, in classifying types of fric-
tional unemployment it is important to identify why tF is not zéro: 
that is, why unemployed workers do not match themselves to va-
cancies instantaneously. The concensus in the récent literature on 
job-search techniques and frictional unemployment would seem to be 
that there are four, not mutually exclusive reasons why frictionally 
unemployed workers might remain unemployed for non-zero amounts 
of time. First, workers may choose potential employers to apply to 
purely at random. In this case, even if there are as many vacancies 
as unemployed workers, the probability that every worker will choose 
a différent vacancy to apply to is very low.2 Secondly, workers may 
simply be poorly informed, in which case even if they try to use a 
non-random search process, more than one worker will apply for some 
vacancies while other «acceptable» vacancies will go unfilled. Thirdly, 
workers may consciously set aside a period of time to use in the gather-
ing of information. And, finally, in markets in which the net advantages 
from employment with each of the firms in that market hâve not been 
equalised, well-informed workers may choose to avoid certain va-
cancies, «queuing» instead for the preferred vacancies. 
1
 N.W. CHAMBERLAIN and D.E. CULLEN; The Labor Sector, (2nd Edi-
tion), McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 518-520. 
2
 If there are N vacancies and N unemployed workers, the probability that 
every worker will choose a différent firm at random, is - ^ . For 10 vacancies and 10 unem-
N N 
ployed workers this probability is approximately 1 in 2,750. 
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It is the latter sources of frictional unemployment — the unemploy-
ment which results because workers require a non-zero amount of time 
to obtain jobs — that has been of greatest concern to economists 
recently. In this context, some of the questions which hâve been raised 
include: Are workers poorly informed about labour market conditions 
when they first become unemployed? Do workers actively gather 
additional information while unemployed — and if so, how? Do work-
ers gain information while unemployed (whether they actively seek 
it or not)? How do workers décide which firms to apply to? And, do 
workers establish a minimum acceptable wage — and, if so, how? 
Empirical studies hâve generally been directed at only two of 
thèse questions — the question of how workers gather information, 
and the question of whether workers set minimum acceptance wages.3 
Furthermore, many of thèse studies hâve not dealt specifically with 
the frictionally unemployed but rather hâve relied heavily on interviews 
with the structurally and cyclically unemployed. For thèse reasons we 
felt that a study which concentrated on unemployed workers in a 
market of very low unemployment and which traced through thèse 
workers' décision processes from the moment they became unemployed 
to the moment they found new jobs would be useful in casting light 
on the détermination of the frictional level of unemployment. 
SURVEY METHODS AND RESULTS 
Clearly, the most reliable method for discovering how unemployed 
workers search for jobs would be to identify workers as soon as they 
became unemployed and then interview them daily (or weekly) until 
they found new jobs.4 However, as the cost of undertaking such a 
survey is prohibitive we chose what we considered to be the next 
most reliable method — interviewing workers shortly after they had 
obtained their jobs. 
3
 Examples of the former type of research are to be found in: G.L. REID, 
«Job Search and the Effectiveness of Job-Finding Methods», Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review, July 1972, pp. 479-495; H.L. SHEPPARD and A.H. BELITSKY; The Job 
Hunt, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966; and D.R. MAKI; Search Behaviour in 
Canadian L&bour Markets, Economie Council of Canada (Spécial Studies, Number 15), 
Ottawa 1972. H. KASPER, «The Asking Price of Labour and the Duration of Unemploy-
ment», Review of Economies and Statistics, May 1967, pp. 165-172, is an example of 
the latter. 
4
 Even this technique would not be without its problems, however. For we 
could not expect the behaviour of the interviewées in such a situation to be uninfluenced 
by the fact that they were being closely observed. 
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As we wished to know what the range of actual wage offers facing 
the unemployed workers was, we chose to restrict our interviews to 
a single, narrowly-defined occupational category within the central 
business district (CBD) of a single city. By asking the workers about 
their current hours, wages, and fringe benefits (at the time of the in-
terview) we were able to construct a detailed profile of actual wage 
and employment conditions, a profile which would not hâve been 
available had we interviewed workers from différent occupational 
groups. 
The occupational group which we felt best suited our require-
ments was clerk/typist as large numbers of thèse workers were avail-
able in the CBD of Calgary (a city of 500,000 population). Also, the 
duties of clerk/typist are clearly defined, allowing for direct comparisons 
between firms. In order to contact potential interviewers we wrote to 
(and telephoned) a random sampling of 250 firms in the CBD of Cal-
gary, (approximately 10 percent of firms in the CBD) requesting permis-
sion to interview their clerk/typists. As a resuit of our strict définition 
of the clerk/typist occupation — we required that their only duties 
were typing and routine clérical work and that they need not be trained 
to take shorthand, to do accounts, or to operate a switchboard — and 
because we only accerted clerk/typists who had been employed at 
the firm in question fer less than 2 years, 158 of the firms contacted 
indicated that they did not hâve employées who met our spécifications. 
Of the remaining 92 firms, 19 refused to cooperate, leaving 73 inter-
views, (a success rate of 79.3 percent). Finally, as 6 of the women in-
terviewed indicated that they had obtained their current jobs without 
a search — they had been offered them while still employed at their 
previous jobs — thèse workers were excluded from our interviews. 
The characteristics of the 67 clerk/typists interviewed are given in 
Table 1. (Ail of those interviewed were female.) 
The questions which were asked of the individuals in the survey 
may be divided into three gênerai groupings: Firstly, in order to check 
that we were in fact dealing with a market in which workers were 
only unemployed for short periods of time and in which workers faced 
a wide range of job opportunities we asked each worker how long 
she had been unemployed before obtaining her current job and what 
her monthly wage was at the time of the interview. Secondly, we 
asked the workers whether they felt they were well-informed when they 
first became unemployed, what their sources of information were 
while unemployed, and how they chose the firms to which they applied. 
Finally, we attempted to détermine whether the workers had ever 
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rejected a job offer and whether they had employed a minimum accep-
tante wage to differentiate between potential (or actual) job offers. 
1. As can be seen from Table 2, the majority of the workers 
interviewed (68 percent), required less than four weeks to obtain their 
jobs; while 12 of the 21 who took four weeks or longer had not made 
their first applications by the beginning of the fourth week. Further-
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of Clerk-Typists Surveyed 
Characteristic Number Percentage Characteristic Number Percentage 
Age: 15-19 14 20.9 Previous 
expérience : 
20-24 41 61.2 No expérience 9 13.4 
25-34 9 13.4 Less than 
1 year 14 20.9 
35-44 3 4.5 More than 
1 year 44 65.7 
45 + 0 0 
Marital Status: Industry : 
Single 39 58.2 Oil & gas 17 25.3 
Married 25 37.3 Professional 
services 10 14.9 
Divorced 2 3.0 Government 10 14.9 
Widowed 1 1.5 Financial 10 14.9 
Insurance 6 9.0 
Real estate 4 6.0 
Travel 3 4.5 
Retail 2 3.0 
Other 
TABLE 2 
5 7.5 
Number of Weeks Unemployed and Unemployed But 
Not Seeking Work 
Duration of Unemployment Weeks Before 
(Weeks) First Application 
Weeks Num ber of Workers Number of Workers 
0 17 17 
0-1 7 30 
1-2 8 8 
2-3 5 0 
3-4 9 0 
4 + 21 12 
Average 7.5 1.8 
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more, ail 12 of those who did not make their first application until 
the fourth week or later indicated that they had treated that period 
of time as a vacation. (See Table 3.) Thus, the average duration of 
unemployment, net of the time taken before making the first applica-
tion, was 5.7 weeks. 
The dispersion of monthly wage rates which we observed was 
much greater than we had expected, given the similarity of the job 
requirements and the skills of the workers interviewed. While the 
average wage was $544.27, the range was $396\ with an inter-decile 
range of $175. The standard déviation of the distribution was $70.81, 
giving a coefficient of variation of 13.01 percent.6 
2. In the next set of questions we wished to find out whether 
the workers felt they were adequately-informed when they first be-
came unemployed, whether they had made any conscious décision 
to improve their information, and how they decided to which firms 
they should apply. In order to answer the first of thèse questions we 
asked: «looking back, do you fell that your knowledge of employment 
possibilities was: very good, good, adéquate, inadéquate, or very 
poor?» Only 12 of the respondents (18 percent) indicated that they 
felt their information was inadéquate or poor at that time, while 30 
(45 percent) felt that their information was good or very good. Although 
the subjective évaluation of information possessed at some point in the 
past may be expected to be influenced by events which hâve occurred 
subsequently, the hypothesis that workers were adequately, or well-
informed when they first became unemployed is supported indirectly 
by the answers which were given to two other questions which were 
asked in widely separated sections of the interview. Firstly, it was ask-
ed whether the workers made «any conscious effort to improve [their] 
information or find out more about labour markets.» Only 16, or 
24 percent, of respondents answered yes to this question — strongly 
indicating that the remaining 51, or 76 percent, felt that their initial 
information was adéquate. Furthermore, workers were also asked 
whether they felt «that the information [they] had at the time [they] 
were hired was essentially correct.» Only 9 workers, or 12.3 percent, 
5
 The range was somewhat exaggerated by the inclusion of two «extraordinary» 
wage rates — $365 and $761. Exclusion of thèse wages reduces the range to $297 ($400 
to $697). 
6
 Analysis of the causes of the observed wide range of wages — to be pre-
sented in a forthcoming paper — indicated that différences between employées in 
training. expérience, and duration of employment contributed little to the explanation 
of wage differentials. 
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answered no to this question. Given that this is consistent with the 
answers to the first two questions — only a slight increase in information 
is indicated, consistent with the low percentage of workers who made 
a conscious effort to improve their knowledge — it again supports the 
finding of the first question, that workers felt they were adequately 
informed when they first became unemployed. This finding — if corrob-
orated by further studies — is potentially of great significance for 
théories of frictional unemployment and the job search, for many exist-
ing théories are based on the (explicit or implicit) assumption that 
workers are poorly-informed when they first become unemployed. l 
TABLE 3 
Activities While Waiting to Make First Application 
Activity Numher of Workers Percentage 
No Time Elapsed 17 25.4 
Nothing 14 20.9 
Vacation 12 17.9 
Researched Job Possibilities/Read Newspaper 24 35.8 
Perhaps the best-known theory of the job search process is found 
in George Stigler's «Information in the Labor Market»* In this paper, 
Stigler implies that the duration of unemployment may be extended 
by the gathering of information; that is, that a certain amount of unem-
ployment is voluntary, with workers spending a significant amount of 
time gathering information before beginning the application process.9 
Followers of Stigler hâve even gone so far as to suggest that, to the 
extent that it allows for spécialisation in the gathering of information, 
unemployment may be efficient.,() A number of questions were includ-
ed in our survey to test the Stigler hypothesis. The results of thèse 
questions suggest that the workers in our sample spent very little time 
collecting information. 
7
 Cf. G. STIGLER; «Information in the Labor Market», Journal of Politîcal 
Economy, Supplément, October 1962, pp. 94-105; and C.C. HOLT; «Improving the Labor 
Market Trade-Off Between Inflation and Unemployment», American Economie Asso-
ciation, Papers and Proceedings, May 1969, pp. 135-146. 
K
 Ihid. 
4
 Ihid. p. 102. 
10
 Cf. A.A. ALCHIAN; «Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemploy-
ment»; in R.S. Phelps. éd.: Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation 
Theory, W.W. Norton, London. 1971, pp. 27-52. 
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For example, as reported above, when asked whether they had 
made a conscious effort to improve their information while they were 
unemployed, only 16 workers (24 percent) answered yes. Furthermore, 
of thèse 16 workers only 9 indicated that their information-search had 
taken place during office hours, (when they could otherwise hâve 
been filing applications). Interestingly, workers did not consider regis-
tration with Canada Manpower, (the government employment exchange), 
or with private employment agencies to be an information-gathering 
activity, as 35 workers (52 percent) had registered with the former and 
39 n (58 percent) with the latter. The reason which the workers in our 
sample give for this attitude was that they considered the employment 
agencies to be extensions of the potential employers' personnel depart-
ments, thus making registration with such an agency part of the appli-
cation process rather than part of the information-gathering process. 
Also, Table 3 indicates that 24 workers (36 percent) spent some time 
researching job opportunities and reading newspaper advertisements 
before making their first application. Although this would appear to 
provide support for Stigler's hypothesis, upon closer questioning thèse 
workers indicated that although thèse activities were carried out prior 
to making any applications, they were not the cause of the delay in 
making applications. Typically, the workers that were inter-
viewed chose to take a short break between jobs, during which time 
they informally «kept their ears open» for job opportunities. 
The workers' response that they made little conscious effort to 
gather information is reflected in Table 4 where the sources of infor-
mation are listed. The first column in this table lists the sources of the 
information which workers possessed when they first became unem-
ployed. The second column identifies the sources of the information 
which were used while the workers were unemployed. The third column 
then identifies the sources of the information which led to the workers 
obtaining their current jobs. (Because of multiple answers to the first 
two questions, only the answers to the third question sum to 67 (100 
percent).) 
Most of the results reported in Table 4 correspond closely with 
results obtained in similar studies.12 A significant différence occurs 
11
 Of those who registered with a private employment agency, 13 registered 
with one agency. 5 with two agencies, 14 with three agencies and 7 with four or more. 
The average number of registrations among thèse 39 individuals was 2.95. 
12
 Cf. G.L. REID, loc. cit., H.L. SHEPPARD and A.H. BELITSKY, op. cit; 
D.R. MAKI, op. cit. ; and A. REES and G. SHULTZ, Workers and Wages in an Urban 
Labour Market, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, Ch. 13. 
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with respect to the sources of information about current jobs, however. 
Most other studies hâve found higher percentages of workers finding 
their jobs through friends and relatives and lower percentages find-
ing jobs through newspapers and employment agencies. This différence 
results, we believe, from the «tightness» of the labour market being 
studied. That is, if employers are experiencing diffkulty in attracting 
workers — as they were in this market — they can be expected to 
increase the intensity of their advertising and the extent of their use 
of employment agencies. With this increase in information from «for-
mal» sources, unemployed workers would not find it as necessary 
to use direct applications or friends and relatives to gather their infor-
mation as they would hâve in a «loose» market. 
TABLE 4 
Sources of Information 
While Information About 
Sources Initially Unemployed Carrent Job 
Number Number Number Percentage 
Newspapers 41 28 9 13.4 
Friends, Relatives, etc. 25 22 14 20.9 
Educational Institution 13 4 1 1.5 
Employment Agencies 
— 
23 33 49.3 
Direct Approach/Other 12 18 10 14.9 
Once we had identified the sources of the workers' information 
and the amount of effort -devoted to increasing this information our 
next step was to investigate the manner in which workers chose to 
which firms they should apply. This is a particularly important ques-
tion for the theory of frictional unemployment as a theory which is 
based on the assumption that workers sample potential employers in 
a random fashion may produce significantly différent prédictions from 
one which assumes that workers are sufficiently well-informed to 
follow a rationally-chosen course of applications. Our findings indicate 
that the workers in our sample did not use a random sampling method; 
rather they tended to apply only to those firms about whose wages 
and working conditions they had some prior knowledge. 
Of the 67 clerk/typists interviewed, 43 (64 percent) indicated that 
they know the names of spécifie firms which had vacancies and re-
stricted their applications to those firms. As can be seen from Table 
5, the overwhelming majority of the remaining 24 workers — workers 
who did not know the names of spécifie firms which had vacancies — 
chose to apply to firms which were known either to employ large 
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numbers of clerk/typists or to hâve high turnover rates. (Banks and 
government agencies received a large percentage of thèse «casual» 
applicants.) Other reasons why workers applied to firms where it was 
not known that there were vacancies were that they knew that work-
ing conditions or wages were good or that they liked the firm's location. 
TABLE 5 
Reasons for Applying to Firms 
Where the Worker Did Not Know There Were Vacancies 
Reasons Number of Workers 
Firm « normally » had vacancies 23 
Firm had good working conditions 1 
Firm had high wages 1 
Location of firm was désirable 2 
A further indication that workers did hâve prior knowledge of 
the wages and working conditions at spécifie firms is that 29 workers 
(43 percent) stated that they had consciously avoided applying for 
a known vacancy. The most common reasons given for this avoidance 
(see Table 6) were that wages were felt to be too low, the working 
conditions were unacceptable, and the location was inconvénient. 
TABLE 6 
Reasons For Avoiding Known Vacancies 
Reasons Number of Workers 
Poor working conditions 14 
Poor location 10 
Low wages 10 
Other 17 
3. In the final set of questions we attempted to discover the 
criteria used by the workers to décide whether to accept a job offer. 
The answers to two questions were particularly useful. First, we asked 
whether the workers had rejected a job offer during their search and, 
if so, why? Surprisingly, 32 workers (48 percent) indicated that they 
had rejected a job offer, with 12 workers (18 percent) indicating that 
they had rejected more than one offer. (The average number of offers 
rejected among the 32 workers was 1.6.) The primary reasons given 
for thèse rejections was that working conditions were not acceptable, 
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although there were also a number of rejections because wages were 
considered to be too low. (See Table 7.) 
Finally, we also asked whether the workers had established a 
minimum acceptance wage, whether they had revised this wage while 
searching, and, where an acceptance wage had been chosen, upon 
what basis that choice had been made. As many theorists hâve pre-
dicted,13 virtually ail of the workers interviewed — 64 out of 67, or 
96 percent — indicated that they had established a minimum acceptance 
wage while they were searching. However, as was to be expected from 
the short duration of unemployment, the average (reported) réduction 
in thèse acceptance wages while the workers were unemployecl was less 
than 2 percent. 
TABLE 7 
Reasons for Rejecting Job Offers 
Reasons Number of Workers 
Poor working conditions 21 
Wages too low 8 
Firm too large 2 
Didn't like location 1 
Received a better offer elsewhere 6 
Also, as there has been some dispute in the literature concern-
ing the manner in which the acceptance wage was chosen, we asked 
workers how this choice had been made. Their answers, unfortunately, 
support neither side's view conclusively, for 34 (53 percent) indicated 
that they had based their acceptance wage on an estimate of the dis-
tribution of potential wage offers, (the Mortensen hypothesis), while 
30 (47 percent) indicated that they had derived their acceptance wage 
by applying a mark-up (or mark-down) to the wage which they had 
been earning in their previous job, (the Holt hypothesis). 
SOME IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide some empirical 
évidence concerning the job-search behaviour of frictionally unemployed 
13
 D.T. MORTENSEN; «A Theory of Wage and Employment Dynamics»; in 
E.S. PHELPS, éd.; Microeconomic Foundation of Employment and Inflation Theory, 
W.W. Norton, London, 1971 ; and C.C. HOLT, loc. cit. Inflation Theory, W.W. Norton, 
London, 1971 ; and C.C. HOLT, loc. cit. 
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workers. Keeping in mind that our results refer to only a small seg-
ment of the labour market, they may be summarised as follows: 
First, the commonly-made hypothesis that workers are poorly-
informed when they first become unemployed was not supported by 
our data, as only 18 percent of those interviewed indicated that they 
felt their information was inadéquate or poor. Secondly, there was 
little évidence that workers consciously sought additional informa-
tion or delayed the application process in order to increase their knowl-
edge of labour market conditions. Rather, our évidence indicates that 
the workers in our sample believed themselves to be adequately-
informed. Where they did delay the start of the application process 
it was not to gather information but to take a rest, or vacation, between 
jobs. Furthermore, once the workers in our sample began to search 
for jobs they did not apply to potential employers in a random fashion 
but applied primarily to those firms about which they had prior infor-
mation. We also found distinct évidence that workers consciously 
chose to apply to those firms known to pay the highest wages and to 
offer the most-favoured working conditions — often purposefully 
avoiding known vacancies at firms with below-standard wages or 
working conditions — and that they made a definite attempt to reduce 
their search times by using employment agencies to pre-screen potential 
employers. Finally, although 96 percent of the workers in our sample 
had established a minimum acceptance wage, only 12 percent has 
used it as a basis for rejecting a job offer — primarily, we suspect, 
because of their success in pre-screening vacancies. 
Because the labour market which was studied differs from others 
in that it was composed of young, unskilled females and in that it 
was geographically very concentrated, the gênerai validity of our results 
might be questioned. However, our a priori expectations concerning 
other labour markets is that our main findings — that workers in a 
« loose » market rely heavily on formai sources of information and that 
they pre-screen potential employers on a non-random basis — would 
be verified if similar studies were undertaken in différent labour markets. 
For example, we would expect that maie heads of households 
would be at least as interested in pre-screening potential employers 
as the females interviewed in our survey, particularly if the pressures 
on them to obtain a job as quickly as possible were greater than on 
young females. Similarly, it seems likely that skilled workers would 
rely just as heavily, if not more heavily, on formai sources of infor-
mation than did the clerk/typists in our study, for the potential for 
variations in spécifie job requirements among skilled jobs would nor-
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mally be much greater than among unskilled jobs. Finally, it would 
appear clear that workers in geographically disperse labour markets 
would place greater reliance on formai sources of information and pre-
screening than workers in concentrated markets. 
It is only with respect to the time spent before beginning the 
job-search process and the time spent in the gathering of information 
that we might expect to find that our results would differ significantly 
from those in other markets. In particular we would expect that house-
hold heads would not allow as much time to lapse before beginning 
the job-search process as did workers in our survey; while it seems 
possible that skilled workers might spend more time gathering infor-
mation than did the workers in this market. 
Keeping the above qualifications in mind, it is our belief that 
if a theory of frictional unemployment is to be consistent with the 
findings of our survey, it should incorporate the following character-
istics: it should allow for the fact that workers feel themselves to be 
at least «adequately» informed when they first become unemployed 
and that few of them consider an overt search for information to be 
profitable. It should also take into account the observation that workers 
use this information to form ex ante rankings of potential employers 
according to wages and working conditions. And, finally, it should 
take account of the observation that workers use thèse rankings to 
enable them to avoid applying to the least-preferred firms and to assist 
them in determining whether or not to accept job offers once they 
are made. To the best of our knowledge none of the théories of fric-
tional unemployment which hâve been developed to date incorporate 
ail of thèse characteristics. 
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Recherche d'emploi et chômage frictionnel 
L'auteur du présent article expose les résultats d'une enquête destinée à four-
nir certaines informations supplémentaires au sujet du chômage frictionnel. 
Il définit d'abord ce type de chômage à partir d'une formule algébrique, puis 
indique trois formes de chômage frictionnel: un chômage transitoire résultant de la mise 
à pied des salariés, un chômage volontaire lorsque ceux-ci quittent volontairement leur 
emploi, un chômage d'entrée au travail, lorsqu'il s'agit des personnes qui arrivent ou 
reviennent sur le marché du travail. 
Dans un deuxième temps, il soulève un autre élément de cette forme de chôma-
ge, soit la période plus ou moins longue au cours de laquelle les travailleurs sont à la 
recherche d'un emploi. Comme le chômage frictionnel est censé se produire lorsque 
les offres d'emploi sont égales ou supérieures aux demandes d'emploi, il est important 
de savoir pourquoi les travailleurs ne se placent pas immédiatement. D'une façon géné-
rale, on admet que quatre raisons principales peuvent expliquer le chômage frictionnel: 
1° les travailleurs peuvent agir au hasard dans la recherche d'un emploi; 2° ils se peut 
qu'ils soient insuffisamment informés quant aux emplois vacants; 3° ils peuvent se ré-
server un temps plus ou moins long afin de recueillir des renseignements plus complets; 
4° il peut arriver qu'ils mettent délibérément de côté certains emplois vacants. 
L'auteur, comme bien d'autres économistes, se posent un certain nombre de 
questions relatives au fait du chômage frictionnel. Les travailleurs en chômage sont-
ils insuffisamment informés des conditions du marché du travail? Pendant qu'ils sont 
sans travail, s'efforcent-t-ils de se renseigner davantage sur l'existence des emplois va-
cants? Selon quels critères, décident-ils de solliciter un emploi? Tiennent-ils compte 
des conditions de travail et des taux de salaire? 
L'auteur a voulu procéder autrement, et voici comment. Il a choisi, aux fins de 
sa recherche, dans la ville d'Edmonton en Alberta l'endroit où étaient concentrées un 
grand nombre d'entreprises, soit ce qu'on appelle communément «le centre des affai-
res. » Il a fait porter son enquête sur une seule occupation, soit celle de dactylo. On leur 
a demandé combien de temps elles étaient demeurées sans emploi avant d'obtenir leur 
poste actuel, si elles se trouvaient suffisamment informées lorsqu'elles sont devenues 
sans travail, quelles furent leurs sources de renseignements au cours de leur période 
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de chômage et selon quels critères elles ont choisi les entreprises où elles ont postulé 
des emplois. Enfin, on a tenté de savoir si elles avaient, entre-temps, refusé une offre 
et si les taux de salaire payés par les employeurs y étaient pour quelque chose. 
— 68% d'entre elles ont réussi à obtenir leur emploi actuel en moins de quatre 
semaines, alors que 12 des 21 qui restaient ne se sont pas mises aussitôt en chômage à 
la recherche d'un nouveau poste. Dans l'ensemble, la durée de la recherche d'un emploi a 
été de 5.7 semaines. 
— Au sujet des renseignements nécessaires à la découverte de ce nouvel emploi, 
42 employées, 12% d'entre elles seulement, ont déclaré qu'elles n'étaient pas suffisam-
ment informées, alors que 30, ou 45%, estimaient posséder de bonnes ou d'excellentes 
informations. 
— Les répondantes estiment aussi qu'elles ne considèrent pas le fait de s'enre-
gistrer aux centres de main-d'œuvre et aux agences de placement privées comme une 
activité de cueillette d'information, estimant que ces organismes ne sont que des ex-
tensions des bureaux de personnel des entreprises. 
Finalement, l'Auteur s'est enquis des critères utilisés par les employées pour 
décider d'accepter un poste. Fait surprenant, 32 dactylos ont rejeté une offre d'emploi 
et 12 en ont refusé plus d'un. La principale raison de ces refus étaient que les condi-
tions salariales étaient inacceptables. 
De cette enquête, l'Auteur cherche à tirer quelques conclusions générales. L'hy-
pothèse selon laquelle les travailleurs manquent de renseignements lorsqu'ils tombent 
en chômage n'est pas confirmée par les résultats de l'enquête. 
